Social Revolution Amid Structural Crises: A Comparative Reading of Revolutionary Theory and the Current Situation in Iran 

Abstract

Drawing on classical and contemporary theories of revolution, this article argues that today’s Iran exhibits most of the conditions identified in political science literature as the “pre-requisites of a social revolution.” An analysis of Iran’s political, economic, cultural, and security trajectories—supported by concrete empirical examples—shows that the country’s governance structure has entered a state of chronic instability. The simultaneous convergence of multiple structural crises has pushed Iran into a phase that can be described as

“the threshold of a revolutionary transformation.” 

1. Introduction

Across most theories of revolution, social revolution is never the outcome of a single factor; rather, it emerges from the intersection and accumulation of several structural crises in the domains of state, economy, society, and culture. This article examines how these factors have become simultaneously active in present-day Iran and discusses the implications of this convergence for the future of the country’s political order and the trajectory of potential regime transition. 

2. Crisis of Legitimacy: The Triple Collapse of Ideology, Performance, and Representation

2.1. Theoretical background 

In the Weberian tradition, legitimacy is regarded as the most important pillar of political survival. In the case of the Islamic Republic, this pillar has been severely eroded—sometimes fully collapsed—across three core dimensions: electoral legitimacy, performance legitimacy, and ideological legitimacy. 

2.2. Electoral legitimacy 

Voter turnout of roughly 8 percent in Tehran in the latest elections, coupled with surveys conducted by institutions close to the state showing that only about ten percent of the population expresses support for the continuation of the regime, illustrates a deep erosion of electoral legitimacy. For a system that defines itself as a “religious democracy,” such figures indicate not merely voter disengagement but a fundamental collapse of public trust in the regime’s representative structures. 

2.3. Performance legitimacy 

Persistent structural inflation exceeding 40 percent, the collapse of the national currency rial, chronic water scarcity, lethal air pollution, and a sharp decline in living standards collectively depict a state apparatus unable to manage the economy or the environment.

Concrete examples—such as water famine and mass protests in Khuzestan, the drying of the Zayandeh Roud, the near disappearance of Lake Urmia, and the destruction of most wetlands—demonstrate that the state has failed even in performing its most basic governance functions regarding essential infrastructure. 

2.4. Ideological legitimacy 

International reports, including those of the UN Special Rapporteur, document large-scale political killings in the 1980s, the bloody suppression of the 2019 and 2022 uprisings, and the continued pattern of violence against intellectuals and artists. The persistence of compulsory veiling policies and systematic violence against women has profoundly undermined the regime’s ideological foundations.

The younger generation—especially Gen Z—has values and lifestyles entirely at odds with the official ideology of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) . The clash between a modern, freedom-oriented way of life and the regime’s ideological doctrine has produced a deep identity rupture.
Within Juan Linz’s analytical framework, the simultaneous collapse of electoral, performance, and ideological legitimacy marks the transition into a “pre-revolutionary stage.” 

3. Fragmentation Within the Regime: From Declining Cohesion to a Succession Crisis

In the theoretical literature—from Theda Skocpol to Charles Tilly—a central assumption is that states become vulnerable to revolutionary challenges when elite cohesion erodes. 

3.1. The two main factions inside the Iranian power structure 

So-called Pragmatic faction

This group, present among parts of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards’ Corps (IRGC)’s economic wing, technocrats, and figures such as current president Massoud Pezeshkian and former president Hassan Rouhani, views “social explosion” as the principal threat. For them, the combination of mass poverty, social humiliation, structural misogyny, corruption, and repression will inevitably produce an uprising—likely larger than the 2022 revolt. Their strategy includes:
• reducing tensions with the West,
• leveraging modest sanctions relief to create economic breathing room,
• slightly opening the social sphere to avert a social explosion,
• preserving the system but in a softened and more cosmetically moderate form. 

Hardline faction

Represented in parts of the Quds Force (IRGC’s extraterritorial unit), intelligence organs, and figures such as Mojtaba Khamenei, Hossein Taeb, and Saeed Jalili, this faction views “ideological slackening” as the existential threat. In their logic:
• negotiations with the United States—especially at the presidential level—are tantamount to surrender;
• retreat on issues like compulsory hijab would signify the collapse of the regime’s identity.
Their strategy consists of maximal securitization, total confrontation with the West, and opposition to any reform. 

Despite differences, both factions agree on one point: a “popular uprising” is the principal danger. Consequently, there is no meaningful strategic divergence regarding the use of executions, violence, and heavy repression. 

3.2. Indicators of declining cohesion within the coercive apparatus 

• escalating conflict between “negotiation-oriented” and “radical” currents over the nuclear file,
  • competition and tensions inside the Supreme Leader’s officeregarding succession,
  • attrition and emigration among technocrats and mid-level IRGC commanders; the IRGC itself increasingly fragmented. 

These trends suggest significant damage to the historical cohesion of the ruling bloc—one of the key preconditions for a revolutionary transition. 

4. Structural Economic Crisis and the Collapse of the Middle Class

Within Marxian and Wallersteinian frameworks, revolutions tend to arise amid structural economic crises. Iran’s economy today exemplifies such conditions. 

4.1. Crisis indicators 

• 80 percent of the population lives under the relative poverty line, and about 30 million people under the absolute poverty line.
  • The Gini coefficient is at one of its highest levels in four decades.
  • Iran experiences one of the world’s highest brain-drain rates.
  • Water scarcity and the destruction of aquifers and wetlands have placed parts of the country on the “threshold of water famine.” 

This reflects the collapse of the state’s “extractive and distributive capacity”—a state unable to generate sustainable revenues or provide even minimal public welfare. 

5. Social Mobilization: The Rise of Decentralized Resistance Networks

In the theories of Tilly and McAdam, revolution requires organizational capacity for social mobilization. Over the past decade, this capacity has visibly emerged in Iran. 

5.1. Evidence 

• Nationwide uprisings in 2017, 2019, 2020, and 2022 show that Iran has entered a “cycle of contention.”
  • The 2022 “Woman,Life, Freedom” movement mobilized across more than 280 cities, now turned into “Woman, Resistance, Freedom”.
  • Expanding strike and protest networks among workers, retirees, and teachers have made full social control unattainable for the state.
  • Growth of “resistance units,” reportedly responsible for more than three thousand anti-repression actions last year. 

This aligns with what Tilly calls “mobilization without centralized hierarchy”—a model that significantly limits the regime’s ability to contain dissent. 

6. Accumulated Grievances: The J-Curve and the Collapse of Social Hope

James Davies’s J-Curve model suggests revolutions are most likely when a period of rising expectations is followed by a sharp decline in living standards. Ted Gurr’s relative deprivation theory points to the widening gap between societal expectations and the state’s capacity. 

6.1. The Iranian case 

• Iran’s youth have adopted value systems shaped by global norms, while the political structureprovidesno mechanism to meet these expectations.
  • Negative economic growth, increasing poverty, and continuous economic contraction (as reported by the World Bank) reflect a collapse of social hope.
  • Public warnings by officials about “livelihood crises” and “sedition risks” further underscore this reality. 

Iran now occupies precisely the position the J-Curve identifies as “the pre-explosion phase.” 

7. External Pressure and the Erosion of State Capacity

In Skocpol’s framework, external pressure is one of the three principal engines of revolution. 

In Iran:
• sanctions have severely restricted the state’s ability to generate revenue;
• the looming threat of snapback sanctions has placed Iran in unprecedented international isolation;
• security failures, especially after the 12-day war, have exposed internal vulnerabilities. 

These dynamics increase the cost of repression and reduce the regime’s crisis-management capacity. 

8. Presence of an Organized Political Alternative

Huntington emphasizes that revolutions without viable alternatives either fail or produce chaos. Iran is distinct in this respect. 

8.1. Evidence 

• The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) has articulated a program including separation of religion and state, gender equality, abolition of the death penalty, and a non-nuclear Iran.
  • The “resistance units” provide operational linkage between the alternative and the domestic population.
  • Broad support from European and North American parliaments demonstrates the rising international legitimacy of this alternative. 

The existence of such a substitute differentiates Iran sharply from cases like Syria and Libya. 

9. Generational Rupture and the Rise of a New Value Paradigm

Ronald Inglehart’s theory of value change offers a useful lens for understanding Iranian society. 

9.1. Characteristics of younger generations 

• secular values, gender equality, and individual freedom;
  • value formation through transnational networks;
  • widespread distrust of formal institutions. 

9.2. Evidence 

• civil resistance against compulsory hijab;
  • total divergence between youth values and the regime’s ideology;
  • a redefinition of citizenship and political engagement outside formal structures. 

This constitutes a clear case of “normative rupture,” recognized in revolutionary theory as a driver of structural transformation. 

10. Erosion of Repressive Capacity: The Final Condition of Revolutionary Transition

In Skocpol’s and Tilly’s theories, revolution succeeds only when state coercive capacity is degraded. 

10.1. Indicators in Iran 

• significant attrition within the Basij and paramilitary forces;
  • disputes between the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence;
  • shortages of personnel and reliance on smaller towns to police major cities;
  • dissatisfaction, burnout, and emigration among younger IRGC members after the 12-day conflict. 

Although repression continues, the regime’s ability to suppress a nationwide uprising comparable to that of 2022 has visibly weakened. 

This article demonstrates that at least nine of the ten classical drivers of social revolution are currently active in Iran: crisis of legitimacy, elite fragmentation, economic collapse, social mobilization, accumulated grievances, external pressure, presence of an alternative, generational rupture, and declining coercive capacity. The convergence of these factors places Iran in what revolutionary theory describes as

“fully revolutionary conditions.”

More than at any time in the past four decades, Iran stands at the intersection of crises that, in the historical experience of other nations, have preceded structural political transformation. The presence of an organized alternative further distinguishes this trajectory from destabilizing regional scenarios and renders the prospect of major political change more realistic than before. 

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