Has the ongoing uprising in Iran moved beyond the stage of “social protest” and entered a phase that political science literature describes as a qualitative transition of an uprising? Signs of this transition—such as the disarmament of repressive forces, direct confrontations with special units, and the breakdown of the deterrent function of state violence—are increasingly visible.
Drawing on classical and contemporary theories of the state, revolution, and social movements, one may argue that this phase does not represent a temporary escalation, but rather the emergence of a structural condition that simultaneously challenges the legitimacy, effectiveness, and monopoly of power (violence) held by the state.
Conceptual Framework: State, Violence, and Obedience
The theoretical point of departure for this analysis is Max Weber’s classical definition of the state: an entity whose existence rests on the monopoly of legitimate violence. As long as this monopoly is preserved—even in the context of widespread social discontent—protests remain at the level of a “political challenge” and do not lead to fundamental change.
However, the moment the instruments of repression slip out of the hands of state forces and fall into the hands of the people, state violence ceases to be either deterrent or exclusive.
Over the past two to three days of the Iranian uprising, dozens of instances of disarmament of repressive forces have been observed. In the city of Tous, in Khorasan Province, insurgent youth stopped a bus carrying Islamic Republic security forces, disarmed them, and tied their hands. At the Si-o-se-pol Bridge in Isfahan, in the Ma’ali Abad district of Shiraz, and in Tehran, numerous similar cases of disarmament have been reported.
When, in Naziabad (Greater Tehran), a young insurgent seized a stun gun from an officer and used it against him, this signaled that repressive forces were suffering losses on the ground. Likewise, on January 6 in the city of Malekshahi (Ilam Province), special units sustained casualties, fled in fear, and the city effectively fell under the control of insurgents. The same occurred on the same day in the city of Abdanan, also in Ilam Province.
As a result, the state has entered a phase that can be described as the erosion of the regime’s coercive capacity.
From Protest to Asymmetrical Violent Confrontation
In social movement theory, a protest is said to “change phase” when it shifts from symbolic action to material action directed against the structure of power. This transition is understood as the result of a transformation in the collective cost–benefit calculation. Put simply, the cost of obedience to the ruling system becomes greater than the cost of resistance.
A widely circulated example on Iranian social media illustrates this shift. In response to a friend who advises him not to participate in demonstrations, a young man replies:
“Why shouldn’t I go protest? My income doesn’t match my expenses. I work from morning to night. What do I have to be afraid of losing? My parents are wasting away in front of my eyes, and I can’t do anything.
My mother dreams of seeing me in a groom’s suit, but my own dream is to die tomorrow. Why shouldn’t I go? Let me go so that at least I don’t fall asleep with a guilty conscience. Let me go so that tomorrow, if my child asks, ‘What did you do?’, I won’t have to say, ‘Nothing.’
Every night, the thought that it’s already getting too late torments me until morning. Why shouldn’t I go? It’s very late. We’ve endured too much. It’s up to here [gesturing to his throat]. I can’t take it anymore. I’m going. If you come too, great. If not, just don’t forget me.”
Social fear is giving way to collective courage.
Whether it is a young woman standing alone in front of a water cannon and stopping a military column; young people sitting in the middle of the street to block the advance of security forces; or insurgents storming detention sites to free comrades arrested by repressive forces—all are clear indicators that social fear has been replaced by collective audacity.
This means that state violence is losing its functional effectiveness. At this point, the uprising enters what may be described as a confrontational insurgent phase—not necessarily classical armed warfare, but direct and asymmetrical engagement with the machinery of repression.
Radicalization as a Structural, Not Ideological, Phenomenon
Contrary to official narratives that attribute “radicalization” to foreign interference or ideology, academic literature largely understands radicalization as a structural reaction. One theorist argues that revolutions begin not with the radicalization of the people, but with the state’s inability to exercise power—in other words, with the declining effectiveness of repression.
In today’s Iran, despite the expansion and diversity of its repressive apparatus (multiple intelligence agencies, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij, law enforcement forces, and others), particularly after the regime’s regional setbacks and the 12-day war with Israel, these forces appear functionally exhausted and fragmented and are no longer capable of exerting a meaningful deterrent effect.
This has created the conditions for direct popular action. Although large numbers of people are arrested, families are no longer intimidated; they gather in front of prisons and detention centers demanding the release of their children.
Therefore, the disarmament of repressive forces serves as a clear indicator of the uprising’s entry into a new phase.
The Pre–Dual Power Condition
In political theory, “dual power” refers to a moment in which two rival centers of authority simultaneously exist within the same territory. Prior to this, however, there is an intermediate phase that can be described as follows:
- Formal state authority still exists;
- But its power is not exercised everywhere or at all times;
- In certain areas, society itself takes the initiative.
In contemporary literature, this condition is described using concepts such as contested sovereignty and the pre–dual power phase. This was observed on January 6 in the cities of Abdanan and Malekshahi in Ilam Province. The disarmament of repressive forces and their de facto retreat constitute classic signs of entry into this phase.
The Collapse of Obedience
Another political theorist draws a fundamental distinction between power and violence:
Power arises from collective obedience, not from weapons.
When people, without centralized leadership or formal orders, but through coordinated action, force repressive forces to retreat, this signals the collapse of the fear equilibrium—a moment that can be described as the Collapse of the Fear Equilibrium.
Analytical Summary
Within a coherent theoretical framework, the “phase shift of the Iranian uprising” may be formulated as follows:
- Erosion of the state’s monopoly on violence;
- Transition from protest to direct confrontation;
- Radicalization driven by the regime’s structural incapacity;
- Entry into a pre–dual power condition;
- Collapse of obedience and the psychological barrier of repression.
In any case, this phase marks neither the end of the uprising nor a guarantee of victory;
but in the historical experience of revolutions, it represents the beginning of an uncontrollable crisis for ruling regimes.
Dear reader,
Opinions expressed in the op-ed section are solely those of the individual author and do not represent the official stance of our newspaper. We believe in providing a platform for a wide range of voices and perspectives, even those that may challenge or differ from our own. We remain committed to providing our readers with high-quality, fair, and balanced journalism. Thank you for your continued support.
