The rise of the far right is an inadequate description for a political shift taking place in Europe. Nationalist and populist parties have gone from the fringes of poltical participation to parliaments, coalitions, and now, even into the mainstream of politics. Their impact is no longer confined to vote numbers, but is also visible in the language of establishment conservative parties, in their influence in the agenda of national debates, and in the policies which governments once thought of as unthinkable.
The European right is used to working through political parties, but it is not being used this way in this moment. It has cultivated a network of politicians, think tanks, donors, conferences, media personalities, religious groups, and transatlantic partners. Such an actor group cannot be said to be moving towards a common goal in a centralized fashion, though this would be a falsehood and an easy read. But more and more they share platforms, tactics, funds and in some cases personnel. The end product is a political system that can outrun most political institutions in its transmission of ideas across borders.
A parliament reshaped
The change is best reflected in the European Parliament. Patriots for Europe were the third largest party in the chamber after the 2024 elections (84 seats). There were 78 from the European Conservatives and Reformists, and 25 from Europe of Sovereign Nations. The situation was tougher than ever after two years: by mid-2026, Patriots for Europe and the ECR were neck in neck for third place, each finishing in the mid-80s, while national conservative and eurosceptic parties throughout the bloc continued to pick up seats via defections and coalitions. The nationalist right has taken control of almost a quarter of the chamber.
What has gone on outside of the chamber is more important than the number of seats. Now the Fidesz in Hungary, the National Rally in France, Brothers of Italy, AfD in Germany, Freedom Party in Austria, Vox in Spain, Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and Chega in Portugal use to play in the political periphery but are now part of the political mainstream. In response, establishment conservative parties have taken more hard-line stances on immigration, borders, and national identity. This is the paradox of this story: while it may not have been the best thing for the new right that the new right has become a government, it may be the best thing for the new right that the political center has been pulled toward the new right.
From national grievance to international project
In the preceding few decades, the parties of the nation were home-grown, based on local grievance, national history. That has changed. Viktor Orbán has made Hungary an intellectual center for a new nationalism and has established ties with European and American politicians and institutions. One facet of that ambition was the creation of Patriots for Europe, not a single far-right super-party, but a network that connects the most important nationalist movements in Europe. Nowadays, European and American politicians, strategists and media personnel routinely meet in such conferences as CPAC.
This exchange is not a guess, it is documented. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung followed approximately 3000 speakers representing 1800 organisations at 302 conferences in 35 countries from 2000 to 2024, recognising CPAC and the National Conservatism conferences as the network’s most significant nodes. Political movements do not become more enduring because they win elections, but because they develop institutions that generate ideas, cultivate activists and generate leadership. The lesson has been learned by Europe’s new right.
The Trump effect and its limits
All of this was hastened by Donald Trump’s return to the White House, but his ties to the right in Europe are a truer picture of the network than any organizational chart could ever be. Trump proved that a nationalist and an anti-institutional agenda and an anti-cultural one were winning and that unhelpful media criticism was also good for the narrative of authenticity. There was a successful transfer of that lesson. Carnegie Europe has reported an increasing level of transnational cooperation among extreme-right and extreme-left political parties in Europe, between politicians and groups like CPAC, and between Hungarian institutions (like the Mathias Corvinus Collegium) and the actors involved in this cooperation.
The partnership between Trump and his closest ally, Elon Musk, hasn’t been a rockstar collaboration, so it should come as no shock that it’s not. Musk invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Trump’s 2024 bid for office, and entered the campaign to head the Department of Government Efficiency, but by mid-2025 he was publicly disagreeing with Trump over federal spending bills, and nearly costing himself tens of billions in market value in one day while he briefly floated the idea of forming a third party. During the fall, the two reached a reconciliation, which was further smoothed out at a dinner at Trump’s New York hotel in early 2026, and Musk has since begun to fund Republican candidates again while tensions have simmered with other players in Trump’s circle. It wouldn’t look like this if there was a set of orders behind this movement. The Trump-Musk cycle demonstrates, on the other hand, a network of powerful, mutually useful agents, that co-mingle, split and recombine depending on the interest at hand – a network that is not a hierarchy but more like a weather system.
This is a welcome alternative to any picture of this movement as being tightly ordered. Trump says he doesn’t personally control the European nationalist parties. What’s more true is that European politicians have discovered his work as a model that can be copied, albeit without his approval or his finances.
Follow the money
The increasing intellectual infrastructure of the right is based on financing that is not always known, as there are significant differences in disclosure rules among European countries. But this opacity alone does not indicate a coordinated intent by all ideological groups to finance research institutes, and funding a think tank doesn’t equate to controlling its product. What’s important is what happens when money creates an ecosystem, not a single campaign: money finances research institutes, research institutes make policy papers, policy papers inform politicians, politicians create coverage, coverage mobilizes supporters, and supporters create more pressure on the political center. No one donor has to be the voice of a policy direction for that chain to make a real political difference. That is why it is time that the funding of think tanks and advocacy groups be held to the same standards as campaign funding.
Britain’s intellectual battlefield
Over the past few years, London has emerged as one of the key nodes for conservative, nationalist and foreign-policy communities. The Henry Jackson Society, whose slogan is ‘international security and democratic values’ and is billed as a ‘think tank’, has been under sustained questioning regarding both its sources of funding and its connections in the pro-Israel and security-policy world. These are questions that need to be looked at; they are not one allegation. There have been cases in which some historical HJS donors have been associated with pro-Israel advocacy groups, but the fact that there are overlaps does not, of itself, indicate that the views of a think tank are determined by that group of donors; more evidence is required.
The more significant connection is with the broader transatlantic conservative movement, one that the British think tanks share with Washington, which has over the years established intellectual infrastructure, including think tanks, legal organizations and media outlets, that influence, rather than define, political agendas but in an increasingly influential way.
The evangelical and Israel dimensions
This kind of exchange fundraising, lobbying, legal advocacy, and grassroots mobilization is honed over decades and offers a political-religious infrastructure of unusual size and sophistication from American evangelical organisations. Organizations like Christians United for Israel have garnered massive political momentum among American Christians, and some American conservative religious and legal groups have formed alliances in Europe. None of this is to say that evangelical organizations are behind the scenes influencing European politics behind the scenes. There is no basis for that claim. What has really spread, however, is strategies for fundraising, messaging and mobilizing that European groups have adapted to their political context.
Israel is in a similar position in this terrain. Those parties that have nationalist and in some instances historically antisemitic leanings have increasingly looked towards Israel for allies and are now claiming to be the strongest defenders of Israel in Europe, partly because of a shared opposition to Islamist terrorism and border security, but also because of the desire by some parties to be free from their own history. However, this alignment is not even or unchallenged. Many Jewish groups do not endorse these alliances, support for Israel doesn’t necessarily equate to moderate or antisemitism-free movements, and several key Jewish groups themselves have expressed concerns about the relationship between Israeli political players and European nationalist parties. It would be a serious analytical mistake to lump Israel, the Jewish political organisations, and the European right together as one bloc.Treating Israel, Jewish political organisations, and the European right as one bloc is a serious analytical error and they are not one bloc.
Musk and the new arithmetic of influence
Musk has brought something fresh to the table: a communication platform operated by a real-world political figure and run by a real-world political figure, that peddles fake news — such as misleading ai videos. The classic comparison for traditional media owners’ editorial lines is the Murdoch family. Musk can communicate directly with hundreds of millions of people, and also control the infrastructure that everyone else uses. He has backed the German AfD, met with its leaders in political debates, and come out against government corruption in several European countries; the Associated Press has dubbed him an “increasingly prominent issue in European political debates” and the European Council on Foreign Relations has said he has become a “real threat” to democratic politics across the continent with his use of X.
Whether Musk is entitled to hold and express these views is not really the question of course he is. But perhaps more importantly, can a company that owns one of the world’s biggest communications platforms be expected to be able to use it as a megaphone for dangerous far-right violent political movements and still enjoy the platform’s distribution? But it’s a real one new democratic quandary, and the fact that even Musk’s own political alliances – including with Trump – have been quite fluid shows the influence is more of a “musking” kind.
