Brussels likes to believe it can compartmentalise risk. Extremism is handled through internal security policy; the Western Balkans through enlargement and stabilisation. One is a problem inside the EU, the other a problem on the way in.
That distinction no longer holds.
Research presented in Brothers in Harm? The Links between the Far Right in the Western Balkans and the European Union shows that far-right ecosystems in Europe are already deeply interconnected — and that actors from the Western Balkans are not passive observers on Europe’s margins, but active participants in transnational extremist networks that EU institutions struggle to contain.
For Brussels-based policymakers, this should ring alarm bells. Not because the Balkans are “exporting extremism” into the EU, but because the EU’s current policy architecture is ill-suited to deal with threats that move fluidly across borders, institutional levels, and ideological camps.
The Balkans Are Not a Sideshow
Far-right actors in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Montenegro are not confined to domestic political struggles. They actively seek recognition, legitimacy, and influence through cooperation with partners in EU member states — from Germany and Italy to France and Scandinavia.
These links take many forms: party-to-party cooperation, participation in pan-European alliances, joint appearances at nationalist conferences, and — more importantly — subcultural collaboration among youth groups, football ultras, and so-called “Active Club” networks. Much of this activity takes place below the radar of electoral politics, and therefore below the radar of EU policy responses.
For Brussels, the message is uncomfortable but clear: focusing on ballot boxes while ignoring street-level and digital ecosystems leaves a significant blind spot.
Why Brussels Keeps Missing the Point
EU institutions remain heavily invested in election-centric monitoring. This makes sense for democratic governance, but it is insufficient for understanding how contemporary far-right movements operate.
The study shows that many of the most durable transnational links persist even when parties fail electorally or collapse organisationally. Networks migrate. Symbols survive. Personal ties endure. Cooperation is less about winning elections and more about maintaining ideological presence, mobilising identity, and sustaining visibility.
Serbia illustrates this dynamic particularly well. While certain far-right parties draw attention because of their international contacts, the more resilient connections emerge at the subcultural level — through Italian far-right milieus, Central European nationalist marches, and loosely organised pan-European extremist platforms. These spaces are difficult to regulate, lightly policed, and rarely integrated into EU-level risk assessments.
Enlargement Policy Meets Internal Security
This is where Brussels’ policy silos begin to crack.
The Western Balkans are still treated primarily through the lens of enlargement conditionality: rule of law benchmarks, judicial reforms, anti-corruption frameworks. Meanwhile, far-right radicalisation is addressed as an internal EU matter — through counter-terrorism, radicalisation prevention, and online content moderation.
Brothers in Harm? demonstrates why this separation is artificial. The same networks operate across accession countries and EU member states, exploiting weak oversight in one space to reinforce presence in another. Diaspora connections, digital platforms, and informal mobility ensure that “inside” and “outside” the EU are increasingly irrelevant distinctions.
For Brussels, this means that Western Balkan policy is no longer just neighbourhood policy — it is internal security policy by other means.
Ukraine, Russia, and Strategic Opportunism
The war in Ukraine further complicates the picture. Far-right actors in the Western Balkans do not display ideological consistency. Some openly align with pro-Russian narratives; others cultivate ties with Ukrainian ultra-nationalist groups; many shift positions opportunistically.
From a Brussels perspective, the problem is not ideological incoherence but strategic ambiguity. These networks can serve as vectors for disinformation, foreign influence, and paramilitary socialisation — all issues the EU already identifies as hybrid threats, yet rarely links back to the Western Balkans in a systematic way.
What Brussels Should Reconsider
The findings of Brothers in Harm? point to several uncomfortable but necessary conclusions for EU policymakers:
First, enlargement and security policy must be treated as interconnected. Ignoring extremist ecosystems while focusing narrowly on institutional reforms risks reinforcing long-term vulnerabilities.
Second, monitoring must extend beyond political parties. Subcultural spaces, youth networks, and digital communities require sustained analytical attention, not ad-hoc responses after crises.
Third, EU support for civil society must become more strategic and transnational. Short funding cycles and national silos do not match the durability of far-right networks that think and operate across borders.
A Test for Brussels’ Strategic Maturity
The far-right actors mapped in Brothers in Harm? are not about to take power. But they are resilient, adaptive, and increasingly European in scope. Treating them as a peripheral Balkan problem is a mistake.
If Brussels is serious about democratic resilience, it must accept a basic reality: Europe’s far-right challenge does not stop at the EU’s borders — and neither can the EU’s response.
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