Six years separated Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 from its assault on Ukraine in 2014. The pretext for both actions was disturbingly similar: Moscow claimed it was protecting Russian minorities from alleged threats. In Georgia, there was some substance of truth when it comes to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, these issues called for diplomatic solutions, not a blatant violation of international law.
In Ukraine, even that faint semblance of justification was just a lie. The annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas region rested on hollow pretexts and exposed Russia’s disregard for sovereignty and the recycling of excuses to see if someone would believe.
Georgia’s fate stands as a stark warning. Following the brief war in 2008, Moscow tightened its grip on the country through overt military aggression and covert political interference. Today, Georgia’s politics is a reflex of Russia’s aggression: a puppet government propped up by fraudulent elections and a population facing international indifference.
Back in 2008, the world largely averted its eyes. European leaders treated the invasion as a localized issue, calculating that Russia’s ambitions were limited to seizing control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They underestimated the Kremlin’s appetite for interference and its willingness to exploit unresolved conflicts to its advantage. As a result, Georgia became a testing ground for Moscow’s warfare tactics – ranging from election fraud to disinformation campaigns on social media and outright invasion and war.
These methods proved effective, and the lessons learned were later exported to Ukraine, where Russia escalated its strategy of destabilization and outright warfare. Now, with Ukraine locked in a brutal war of survival, Europe cannot afford to make the same mistake.
Since Georgia, Moscow has refined its playbook. Russia uses propaganda to divide societies, supports far-right parties to destabilize democratic governments, and exploits nostalgia for the Soviet Union to gain sympathy from segments of the far left. These tactics have been employed not only in Eastern Europe but across the EU, undermining trust in democratic institutions and sowing discord. Despite regulations attempt, social media is still a breeding ground for Russia’s disinformation campaigns.
Georgia is back to the spotlight, with a gross electoral fraud giving yet more power to pro-Russian assets. And also, not only Georgia, but in Romania, another Russian asset, using social media disinformation, managed to get to the second round of the presidential elections – with the warning of Georgia’s president, Salome Zourabichvili, that it’s all part or Moscow’s plan. Russian’s interference was so blatant that Romania’s top constitutional court annulled the first round of the elections. Moldova also faced the consequences of Kremlin’s actions, narrowly holding back and beating blatant electoral fraud.
Russia’s disinformation campaigns are so well-tailored, that Europe ends up running after its own tale. In 2020, alluding to Catalonia’s 2017 independence referendum, the Spanish government accused Russia of interfering in the campaign to foment instability in Europe. However, these accusations were largely based on exaggerated claims and weak evidence, serving more as a convenient smokescreen than a genuine effort to confront Kremlin aggression – the case was finally dismissed on 18 December.
By focusing on fabricated instances of interference, Europe allowed itself to overlook the far more pressing issue, that is, real Russian interference. From Brexit to support for extremist parties and governments in Spain, Hungary, and Germany, Russia’s fingerprints are everywhere. Yet the EU has largely chosen to look the other way, focus on fake interference, or worse, has treated the issue as an inconvenient distraction rather than a core threat to European unity.
Russia’s calculus is clear: the longer the war grinds on, the more it can exploit Europe’s divisions and erode its resolve. By interfering in elections, funding extremist parties, and amplifying disinformation, Moscow aims to weaken the EU from within, making it less capable of responding to external threats.
This is not a theoretical danger. The Kremlin’s fingerprints are visible in Hungary’s and Slovakia’s alignment with Russian interests, in the financing, via Hungary, of far-right Vox party, and even in Germany’s historical dependence on Russian energy and closeness of both far-right AfD and far-left Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht with Putin. The EU must recognize that these actions are not isolated but part of a broader strategy to undermine its political cohesion and strategic autonomy.
Member states like Hungary cannot act as Moscow’s Trojan horse while enjoying EU benefits; Protecting elections from interference and blocking Russian money flows through greater political funding transparency is crucial as well as unconditional support for Ukraine is vital—accelerating military aid, tightening sanctions, and aiding its reconstruction are non-negotiable.
To combat Russian disinformation, Europe needs media literacy programs, fact-checking initiatives, and stricter rules for social media platforms that tackles not speech, but algorithms and how they work. It’s also a great opportunity to promote a debate on algorithm governance and on giving civil society more power over how algorithms work and greater transparency.
The European Union can no longer afford to pretend that Russia’s aggression is someone else’s problem. Georgia, Romani,a and Moldova are visible examples while Ukraine is bearing the brunt of Moscow’s ambitions, fighting not only for its sovereignty but for the principles of democracy and self-determination that underpin the European project.
If Europe fails to act decisively, it risks repeating the mistakes of the past. The Kremlin’s appetite for influence knows no bounds, and its tactics will only grow more sophisticated. By punishing those who enable Moscow, strengthening defenses against interference, and standing firmly with Ukraine, the EU can send a clear message: Europe will not be divided, nor will it be conquered by stealth.
The time for complacency is over. The time for action is now. Europe must do its homework—and it starts with taking Russia’s threat seriously.
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