The Cairo agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), announced on September 9, was presented as a mutual understanding. However, both sides have since offered divergent—at times even contradictory—interpretations of its terms.
According to Reuters, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that Iran had agreed to grant international inspectors access to key nuclear sites. This access would allow assessment of damage from U.S. and Israeli airstrikes in June and permit examination of uranium stockpiles enriched near weapons-grade levels.
In contrast, Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi told state television:
“Yes, inspections are part of the agreement, but all considerations of the Parliament and the Supreme National Security Council have been taken into account.”
His vague remarks only deepened existing confusion.
A Wall Street Journal correspondent echoed these concerns, writing,
“My impression is that the agreement between Grossi and Araghchi is not sufficiently clear.”
Likewise, the state-affiliated website Entekhab reported that no deadlines were set for the return of inspectors to the damaged facilities. There was also no timetable for reports on the status of sites in Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, or Iran’s broader uranium stockpile. As a result, access for IAEA inspectors remains shrouded in uncertainty.
On the same day, Reuters reported that the E3—France, the UK, and Germany—had triggered the “snapback mechanism,” a process designed to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran. The European powers stated this could be suspended only if Iran permitted full inspections, disclosed its stockpile levels, and reentered serious negotiations with the United States.
In short, despite the Cairo agreement, Iran’s nuclear issue remains at a critical and precarious juncture. An ambiguous deal, dangerously high uranium reserves, the looming threat of sanctions, and potential withdrawal from the NPT have all pushed the crisis into an increasingly unstable and volatile phase.
Why the Iranian Nuclear Crisis Remains Unresolved
From its inception, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program has been closely tied to the regime’s political survival. As former parliamentarian Ali Motahari once admitted,
“Iran’s nuclear program was originally designed to produce a bomb.”
Today, the Supreme Leader faces three main options:
- Abandon uranium enrichment entirely and permanently renounce nuclear weapons.
- Continue on the current path toward high-level enrichment and potential bomb development.
- Pursue a middle course—maintaining enrichment at the 3.67% level (as allowed under the JCPOA) while preserving the infrastructure for a rapid return to weapons-grade enrichment.
Iran appears to be following the third path, attempting to appease European powers just enough to delay or avoid full implementation of the snapback mechanism. Several actions reflect this strategy:
- Diplomatic outreach to Oman and Qatar is underway to facilitate a new negotiation track with the U.S.
- A new deal with Rafael Grossi has been signed, though its details remain undisclosed.
- Some French hostages held in Iran might be released, possibly to encourage France into easing its stance on sanctions.
Most notably, during this critical period, Iran’s parliament has gone on recess. Although not without precedent, the state-run Asia News labeled the move a strategic failure, writing:
“In a surprising and controversial decision, Parliament has gone on an 18-day recess during one of the most sensitive periods in Iran’s recent history. This appears less a tactical error and more a strategic failure in governance.”
The Path the Regime Has Chosen
Following the Cairo agreement, Araghchi stated in a televised interview that “all enriched uranium is buried beneath facilities that were bombed.” He added that the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization was evaluating whether the material remained usable.
This statement suggests that even Iran’s adherence to low-level enrichment (3.67%) is less a sign of de-escalation than a means of preserving technical infrastructure for future escalation.
According to Reuters, the European powers (France, the United Kingdom, and Germany) triggered the so-called “snapback” mechanism (automatic reinstatement of sanctions) on September 9. They specified that this process would only be suspended if Iran allowed inspections, declared its stockpiles of enriched uranium, and engaged in genuine negotiations with the United States. On September 17, the foreign ministers of Germany, the United Kingdom, and France held a phone conversation with Abbas Araghchi. Following this discussion, the spokesperson for the German Foreign Ministry stated that “at this stage, the measures taken by Iran have not been sufficient.”
Given this trajectory, a fundamental resolution to the nuclear crisis seems unlikely. The only viable solution would be a complete cessation of enrichment and unrestricted access for IAEA inspectors to all suspected nuclear sites—a necessary step toward ensuring peace in both the Middle East and Europe.
Has the World Learned Nothing from the Last Decade?
If world powers had taken a firmer stance during the 2015 nuclear talks—setting aside economic and political calculations—it might have been possible to dismantle Iran’s weapons program entirely. In that case, today’s crisis might have been averted, particularly for Europe.
Decades of experience have shown that appeasement toward Tehran has not prevented conflict—it has made it inevitable. Had the international community adopted a tougher posture earlier, Iran would never have gotten this close to nuclear weapons. Some broader regional crises, including the Gaza war, might even have been prevented.
The ultimate resolution to the Iranian nuclear crisis lies not in half-measures or temporary deals, but logically in regime change led by the Iranian people and their organized resistance. Maryam Rajavi, president-elect of the opposition National Council of Resistance of Iran, warned on November 20, 2013, during the Geneva talks with the P5+1:
“Any agreement with the mullahs’ regime, without the complete halt of uranium enrichment, will merely give it more opportunities to build nuclear weapons.”
The NCRI was the first to blow the whistle on Iran’s secret nuclear facilities in 2002.
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